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1 Introduction
The rise of the dual career household is a recent phenomenon. In 1940, among couples aged 25
to 45 in which both husband and wife had at least a four year college education, only 18 percent
of wives worked.1 Even women who had taken the same courses as men generally became
school-teachersupon graduation,leaving thelabor forcebecause ofmarriagebars. Goldin(1997)
describes the experience of these women as “ﬁrst jobs then family.” By 1970 the labor force
participation rate of prime-aged college-educated wives married to college-educated men had
risento 39percent, but theexperience of these womenwas oneof “ﬁrst familythenjobs” (Goldin
1997). Fifty-ﬁve percent of them had majored in such ﬁelds as education and nursing where
few men got degrees and upon graduation had been tracked into traditionally female sectors,
regardless of their majors. They left the labor force when their ﬁrst child was born and only
re-entered when all children were in school. By 1990, and to a lesser extent by 1980, prime-aged
college-educated wives of college-educated men aspired to “career then family” or “career and
family” (Goldin 1997). Their college majors were more similar to men’s and in terms of labor
supply parameters they began to resemble men as well, with small wage and income elasticities
(Goldin 1990: 119-158). By 1990 74 percent of them were in the labor force.
As more households become dual career households, more of them face a colocation
problem. Mincer (1978) and Sandell (1977) emphasized the “tied” worker effect where to
maximize household income the secondary earner, traditionally the wife, might forgo matching
with her best local labor market. Wives, however, may be increasingly unwilling to pay the
economiccosts of being the tied mover or stayer. As women’swages have risen relativeto men’s,
asdivorcerateshaveincreased,andasthereturnsto experiencehavegrown,theeconomiccosts of
1All labor force participationnumbers are estimated from the integrated public use census samples (Ruggles and
Sobeck 1995).
1being the tied mover or stayer have risen. Forty-ninepercent of women in two-career households
interviewed in 1998 classiﬁed their careers as equal in importance to those of their husbands.2
Mincer (1978) argued that a possible outcome of the rise in dual career households and
the resultingincreased tension over the migrationand locationdecision was the dissolution of the
marriage. But, more optimistically, he also suggested that living in large metropolitan areas with
diversiﬁed labor markets reduces the degree to which both husband and wife must compromise
their individual gains from marriage. This strategy is well known to dual career households. A
couplefeaturedinan articlein theChicago Tribune(March16, 1986)advised thatlivinginalarge
metropolitan area was part of the success formula for a two-career family, “You need to select
a large city that has an abundance of jobs and is a place where you’d like to spend a substantial
amount of your life.”3
The rise of the dual career household should lead to their greater concentration in large
metropolitan areas. This paper documents trends in locational choice between large and small
metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas since 1940 by household type. By comparing the
locational decision of dual and non-dual career households and of dual career and single house-
holds we are able to identify whether dual career households are increasingly disproportionately
located in large urban areas because these areas solve the colocation problem or whether their
increasing concentration arises from another reason such as these areas offering higher returns to
education or urban amenities being normal goods. We also document trends in wages by skill
level and city size and trends in rents by city size to establish how the incentives of being in a
2Cited in USA Today, November 23, 1998.
3Mincer’s intuition is also supported by suggestive, but inconclusive, evidence on the residence patterns of
professionals. Frank (1978a) found that in 1970 professional women (a group likely to be married to professional
men) had ahigher probabilityof livingina largeurban area than professionalmen (relativelyfew of whomwouldbe
married to professional women). Similarly, Marwell, Rosenfeld, and Spilerman (1979) showed that in 1969 married
academic women were more likely than married academic men to live in large metropolitanareas.
2large city have changed for different households.
Our ﬁndings have implications for city growth. Large cities offer many more potential
job matches. As skilled professionals are increasingly bundled with an equally skilled spouse,
their demand for large cities will increase. The presence of large numbers of highly skilled
workerswithina concentratedgeographicarea mayin turnprovidepositive growthexternalities.4
Smallercities, particularlythoselocated inlowamenityareas, mayexperience reducedinﬂowsof
human capital relative to the past and thereforebecome poorer. In 1998 55 percent of companies
listed a spouse’s employmentas the biggest reason for employeesdeclining a job relocation.5 We
present some suggestive evidence on the ability of ﬁrms in small cities to attract highly skilled
workersby examing how the relationshipbetween city size and the quality of universitygraduate
programs has changed since 1970.
Our ﬁndingsalso have implicationsfor trendsin household incomeinequality. Because
the growth of large metropolitan areas enables professional couples to solve their joint location
problem large this may magnify household income inequality.
2 Household Locational Choice
This paper studies household locational choice conditional on marital status. Consider ﬁrst the
migration decision in the absence of marriage. At a point in time an individual will calculate the
expected lifetime present value of moving to a given city, accounting for wages (including the
probability of ﬁnding a good match), rents, and amenities and move to the city that offers the
4This insight has been incorporated in theoretical models (Lucas 1988; Acemoglu 1996) and is supported by
empirical investigationsof the relationship between wages and average human capital (Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd 1996; Rauch 1993) and local growth and average human capital within a city (Simon 1998; Glaeser, Shleifer,
and Scheinkman 1995).
5Cited in USA Today, November 23, 1998.






















j are wages, rents, and amenity values in city
j. Although a household may
later choose to locate to a different sized city, the initial decision on what size metropolitan area
to move to will both determinecurrent earnings and be an investment in futureearnings (Sjaastad
1962).
Now consider how marriage affects the locational decision. In a static model a couple
marries and then decides what city to live in. Assuming that marital matching occurs on love not
ambition, the husband’s best match is not necessarily the wife’sbest match. The couple therefore
has a colocation problem.6 One resolution of the colocation problem is for one spouse to make a











This joint expected present value may be less than the combined maximum expected present








In a dynamic model, forward looking singles would forsee future colocation problems and move
to cities that both offer rich marriage markets and that minimize the differential between the
6We recognize that if the colocation problem is severe enough certain marriages never take place. For a survey
of the gains to marriage and marriage formation see Weiss 1997. See also Becker (1991).
4maximum joint expected present value and the combined maximum expected present value that
a couple living in separate cities could obtain (3-2).7
Note that in both the dynamic and static models the colocation problem arises because
of bundling. If individuals could live in one city and work in another then this would not be a
problem. Althoughforsomeindividualscommutingisanoption,itiscostly. Ifneithercommuting
nor transfers within the marriage are an option then the marriage may dissolve.
Large cities mitigate the colocation problem. Large metropolitan areas offer couples in
which both husband and wife are pursuing specialized, professional careers a much larger market
fortheirskillsandthusmakeitmorelikelythatbothhusbandandwifecanﬁndjobscommensurate
with their skills in the same location.8 Because large cities offer more potential job matches, the
probabilityofdrawingagood initialmatch ishigher. The probabilityof drawinggood subsequent
matches is also higher and this increased job mobility will lead to greater lifetime wage growth
(Topel and Ward 1992). Furthermore, if the initial match was a poor one, then the probability
of drawing a good match on the second try will be higher than in a smaller city. A spouse who
knows that the other spouse has these options in a large city can therefore make ﬁrm speciﬁc
career investments. The ﬁnancial sacriﬁce to being in a large cityis thereforelikelyto be smaller.
The colocation problem is likely to be most severe among highly educated couples
because of their specialized skills. Of course, there may be other reasons that such couples prefer
to live in larger cities. Because any single individual can ﬁnd a better match in a large city
7An alternative model would be that singles migrate to a city, marry, and remain there out of inertia. This model
assumes that couples do not take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. But, mobility among married men is high.
Among married, native-born men age 30 to 45 in 1940, 40 percent lived in a state other than their state of birthand 6
percent had moved to a different state and 5 percent to another metropolitanarea withinthe last 5 years. The ﬁgures
for their 1990 counterparts were 83 percent, 32 percent, and 30 percent, respectively.
Despite the high mobility of married couples, most migration is within the same city size category. This is true
for couples married within the last ﬁve years as well.
8Baumgardner (1988) documents the greater specialization among physicians found in large cities. See Kim
(1989) for a theoretical model of labor specialization and the size of the labor market.
5the returns to education are greater in larger cities. Larger metropolitan areas also offer such
amenities enjoyed by the highly educated as museums and theaters. The cost of living in a large
metropolitan area is higher rents and such urban disamenities as crime and pollution.9 However,
since1970 thesedisamenity costshave been falling(Glaeser 1998; Kahn 1997). Higherreturnsto
education and urban amenities will therefore make large cities attractive to households without a
colocation problem. Such households include those in which only one spouse is highly educated,
singleindividuals(whomayalsovaluecitiesfortheirmarriagemarkets),and householdsinwhich
the wife does not work. Households in which the wife has a strong attachment to the labor force
will ﬁnd large cities attractive because both husband and wife are more likely to ﬁnd a good job
match in such a city. City size may determine the wife’s propensity to work. In a city in which
the wife can ﬁnd a good job match the substitution effect of the wife’s wages is greater thus
increasing her probability of working, but the income effect from the husband’s wages counters
the substitution effect.10
We viewall households as one of 7 types: “power” couples in which both spouses have
a college education, “part-power” couples in which only one spouse has a college education,
“low-power” couples in which neither spouse has a college education, and single households
of college educated men, college educated women, non-college educated men, and non-college
educated women.11 Each household will consider therents, wages, and amenitiesofferedby each
city size. Unlike two single individuals, a married couple can economize on rents. At a point in
time a spatial equilibrium is an allocation of households across cities such that no household can
9Of course, within a given metropolitan area there is Tiebout sorting such that households can choose their
communities withinthe metropolitanarea and match their tastes with the taxes and services these localities provide.
10In aggregate, own wage effects dominate cross effects between husband and wife in accounting for changes in
married women’s participation rates (Juhn and Murphy 1997; Mincer 1962).
11Althoughtwocollege-educated spouses do not make a dual career household, college education of bothspouses
is nonetheless a necessary condition. We will later compare the locational choice of couples in which the wife is in
a traditionallyfemale occupation, with that of couples in which the wife is not in such an occupation.
6Table 1: Percentage of Marriages by Couple Type
1940 1960 1970 1980 1990
Low-Power 90.1 83.5 78.2 69.8 64.0
Part-Power 6.9 11.8 14.3 17.7 19.7
Power 2.2 4.7 7.5 12.5 16.2
Note. A power couple is deﬁned as one in which both husband and wife have had at least 4 years of college,
a part-power couple as one in which only one spouse has had at least 4 years of college, and a low-power
couple as one in which neither spouse has had at least 4 years of college. Allnumbers are estimated from the
integrated publicuse sample (Rugglesand Sobek 1995)and are forhouseholdsin whichthe husband was age
25-45.
raise its expected present value of utility by moving and no ﬁrm can raise its expected proﬁts by
moving.12
2.1 Trends: Power Couple Formation
Theproportionofmarriedcouplesinwhichbothhusbandandwifehaveatleastacollegeeducation
has increased from 2 percent in 1940 to 16 percent in 1990 (seeTable 1). The percentageincrease
in the proportion of couples in which only one spouse has a college education has been smaller,
rising from 7 percent in 1940 to 22 percent in 1990.13 These increases in the relative proportion
of power couples arose largely from greater college attendance rates, which in turn were spurred
both by the growth of public universities and of high schools and by the rising economic returns
to college.14
Rising wives’ labor force participation rates, increases that have been larger among
12For a fuller discussion of the cross-sectional compensating spatial equilibrium see Roback (1982), Blomquist,
Berger, and Hoehn (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991).
13Among part-power couples in 1940, the husband was the college-educated spouse in 76 percent of all cases. In
1990 he was the college-educated spouse in 63 percent of all cases.
14Althoughprime-aged women in1970gained littledirect economicreturn fromtheir degrees, their indirectgains
were considerable because for them college was a marriage market (Goldin 1992). Additionalfactors increasing the
percentage of power couples include increased assortative mating (Pencavel 1998; Mare 1991; Goldin1992).
7Table 2: Employment and Fertility Trends by Education of Couple
1940 1960 1970 1980 1990
Wife Works (%)
Low-Power 16.9 29.0 38.5 53.6 65.6
Part-Power 15.9 25.1 28.9 57.9 71.3
Power 18.2 31.7 39.1 64.9 74.3
Have Child (%)
Low-Power 74.3 87.5 88.5 85.5 83.3
Part-Power 65.8 86.4 87.2 77.6 76.2
Power 64.0 83.5 79.3 70.2 71.0
Wife Works and in
Traditionally Female Job (%)
Power 69.9 71.2 73.5 60.0 47.0
Note. A power couple is deﬁned as one in which both husband and wife have had at least 4 years of college,
a part-power couple as one in which only one spouse has had at least 4 years of college, and a low-power
couple as one in which neither spouse has had at least 4 years of college. All couples are restricted to those
in which the husband was between 25 and 45 years of age. All numbers are estimated from the integrated
public use sample (Ruggles and Sobek 1995).
power couples than among low power couples, have made power couples true dual career house-
holds and increased the fraction of power couples with a colocation problem (see Table 2).15 The
labor force participation rate of power couple wives rose from 18 to 74 percent between 1940
and 1990, whereas the increase for low-power wives was from 17 to 66 percent. The proportion
of working power couple wives in such traditional female occupations as school teacher, nurse,
librarian, or social worker fell from 70 to 47 percent between 1940 and 1990. The percentage
with at least one child rose to 84 percent in 1960 from 64 percent in 1940, but by 1980 had fallen
to 70 percent.16 These increases in wives’ labor force participation rates and their entry into
15Some of the growth in wives’ labor force participation rates may arise from the increased propensity of women
who aspire to careers to marry (Goldin 1997).
16When we stratify the data by city size we ﬁnd that married women in large cities have lower fertility rates. For
example, in194076 percent ofwomen in non-metropolitanareas had a childcompared to 72percent inmetropolitan
areas. In 1990 84 percent of women in non-metropolitan areas had a child compared to 80 percent in small
8traditionally male jobs have increased the costs to a household of picking a city size in which the
wife earns relatively little. Furthermore, fallingtransport costs have lowered the price of moving
to a city distant from family members.
2.2 Trends: Location
We predict that the major social changes of the last decades have affected the location decision
of households as follows:
￿ Power couples will be increasingly concentrated in large cities because large cities solve
the colocation problem; because they can obtain higher returns to their education in larger
cities and, unlike single people, they can economize on rents; and ﬁnally, because city
amenities are normal goods.
￿ We should observe this increasing concentration of power couples relative to part-power
and low power couples, particularly between 1970 and 1980 or 1990 because women in
1980 and 1990 were more similar to men in terms of labor force attachment than women in
1970 or earlier.
￿ Married women’s labor force participation should be higher in large cities, particularly in
the last decades.
￿ If a wife never works or if her occupation is the same as her husband’s the couple may not
need the diversiﬁed market offered by a large metropolitan area.
metropolitanareas and 77percent inlargemetropolitanareas. Oneplausibleexplanationisthatwomeninlargecities
substitutetowards market rather than non-market activities. Women in smaller cities may also face a lower price of
high qualitychild care. Hofferth and Wissoker (1992) ﬁnd that the child to staff ratio in day care centers is higher in
metropolitan than in non-metropolitanareas.
9Table 3: Costs and Beneﬁts of Living in a Large City for Power and Part-Power Couples at a
Point in Time
Returns to
Education Rent Amenities Colocation
1 Wife Works and Power ++ - ++ +
2 Wife Works and Part-Power + - + 0
3 Double Difference (1-2) + 0 + +
4 Wife Does Not Work and Power ++ - ++ 0
5 Wife Does Not Work and Part-Power + - + 0
6 Double Difference (4-5) + 0 + 0
7 Triple Difference (3-6) 0 0 0 +
Note. If amenity values are assumed to be the same for power and part-power couples then the double and
tripledifference are equivalent. If wives are highly responsive to income and substitutioneffects then only a
double difference regardless of the wife’s labor force status can be estimated.
We establish whether theproportionof power couples in large citiesis rising because of
thecolocationproblemorbecause thereturnstoeducation arerising inlargecitiesanddisamenity
costs are falling by using part-power couples and single households as a control group for power
couples. If the latter factors are the primary explanation then we should observe an increasing
proportion of part-power couples and single households in large metropolitan areas as well.
Table 3 provides a schematic illustrationof the costs and benﬁts of being in a large city
for power and part-power couples at a point in time.17 Power couples may be in large cities
because of the colocation problem, increasing returns to education for both husband and wife (or
a better probability of ﬁnding a job match regardless of current labor force participation status),
and amenities. In contrast part-power couples may be in largecities because of increasing returns
17This tables assumes that all items such as amenities enter theutilityfunctionlinearly and that there is no sorting
suchthatpowerindividualsmarriedtopowerindividualsearn higherreturnstotheireducationorvaluecityamenities
differently than power individualsmarried to low-power individuals.
10Table 4: Costs and Beneﬁts of Living in Large City for Power and Low-Power Couples and Two
Power and Coincidental Couples at a Point in Time
Returns to
Education Rent Amenities Colocation
1 Power Couple ++ - + +
2 Power Coincidental Couple ++ - - ++ 0
3 Double Difference (1-2) 0 - + +
4 Low-Power Couple 0 - + 0
5 Low-Power Coincidental Couple 0 - - ++ 0
6 Double Difference (4-5) 0 - + 0
7 Triple Difference (3-6) 0 0 0 +
Note. Notethat amenities are assumed to differby coupletypeonlybecause large cities offer goodsattractive
to singles such as a marriage market.














￿40 is the change in the proportion of power couples in a large city between 1990




￿40 is the change in the proportion of part-power couples, therefore captures
the differential trend in returns to education, amenities, and colocation. The triple difference





































W indicates that the wife works and
N
W that she does not, measures the impact of
changes in the severity of the colocation problem. Note that the triple difference assumes that
income and substitution effects are small and that there are two types of wives: those who work
and those who do not. If income and substitution effects are large and if amenity values are
11the same for power and part-power couples, the double difference in Equation 4 will be a better
estimate of the impact of the colocation problem than the triple difference in Equation 5.
Now consider the comparison between power and low power couples and two single
individuals, one male and one female, coincidentally living in a large city. Singleindividualswill
have no colocation problem but will have different amenity values because they value large cities














P indicates two power singles, therefore measures the differential trend in rents (singles
pay two rents rather than one), amenities, and colocation. The double difference between low-













































measures the extent of the change in the proportion of power couples in large cities that arises
from an increasingly severe colocation problem.18
18This will of course be true only if items such as amenities enter the utilityfunction linearly and if singles differ
from married individualsonly in their marital status.
123D a t a
We examine long-term trends in locational choice using the 1940 and 1970-1990 censuses of
population and housing.19 For each person we observe marital status, age, sex, race, education,
labor force status, occupation, and metropolitan area. We restrict the sample to couples in which
the husband was 25 to 45 years of age because we do not wish to examine couples at the end of
their careers.
We use city population size as a proxy for the potential number of job matches. We
classifythesuburbsofcentral citiesaspart ofthelabormarketofthecentralcity(e.g. Westchester
county is classiﬁed as part of the New York City labor market). Because the Census Bureau used
different deﬁnitions and taxonomies to describe the geography of metropolitan areas in our
four census years, we experimented with different deﬁnitions of what constituted a particular
metropolitan area. For example, the 1940 and 1970 censuses did not include Santa Rosa as
part of the San Francisco Bay Area whereas those of 1980 and 1990 did. We therefore created
two different deﬁnitions of the San Francisco Bay Area. One was based purely upon the 1970
deﬁnition and excluded Santa Rosa. The second deﬁnition excluded Santa Rosa in 1970 (when it
was still a small, rural town) but included it in 1980 and 1990 (when it had become a suburb).20
Although our results were not affected by the deﬁnition that we used, we present results using the
second deﬁnition because we want to allowfor the expansion of metropolitan areas into farmland
at the periphery (Brueckner and Fansler 1982). The large price elasticity of housing (Topel and
Rosen 1988) suggests that this conversion can be rapid.
We create 5 city size categories: non-metropolitan, or, if metropolitan, one of four
19We use the integrated public use micro samples available at http://www.hist.umn.edu/ipums. Earlier censuses
did not identify education. We cannot use the 1950 census because education is known only for the sample line
person. We cannot use the 1960 census because metropolitanarea is not identiﬁed.
20Jaeger et al. (1998) show how to construct consistent deﬁnitions of metropolitanareas from 1970 to 1990.
13classes such that each one contains 25 percent of the population that is in all metropolitanareas.21
Note that the deﬁnition of a metropolitan area differed across years. The 1940 and 1950 censuses
identiﬁed metropolitan areas if the population in these areas was at least 100,000 in 1980 and the
1980 and 1990 censuses identiﬁed metropolitan areas with populations of at least 100,000 in the
census year. The 1970 census identiﬁed metropolitan areas with populations of at least 250,000
in 1970. We may therefore underestimate the extent of the move away from non-metropolitan to
metropolitan areas between 1940 and 1970 and between 1970 and 1980.
We predict that the concentration of power couples will differ across non-metropolitan
areas and areas in the bottom and top ﬁftieth percentile. However, this concentration may not
necessarily be higher in larger cities within the upper ﬁftieth percentile. For some professionals,
the New York city area may provide a thinner market than the Boston area.22 We do not classify
cities based on which industries are over-represented. We do not observe the industry of non-
working wives. Furthermore, with the exception of Washington DC, there were relatively few
differences in cities in the top ﬁftieth percentile by broad industry category.
We use information on what city size category a couple chooses to live in and whether
thewifeworksto create10 groups, oneeach for wife’slabor forceparticipationstatus and thecity
sizecategory. Wethenestimateamultinomiallogitofthechoiceofwife’slaborforceparticipation
and city size as a function of the age, race, and educational attainment of the husband and wife.
21Cities in the top quartile in 1940 were Chicago and New York; in 1970 Chicago, Los Angeles, and New
York; in 1980 Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco; in 1990 Chicago, Los Angeles,
New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Cities in the second top quartile in 1940 were Boston, Cleveland,
Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco; in 1970 Boston, Cleveland, Dallas,
Detroit, Houston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and WashingtonDC; in 1980 Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Miami, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego,
Seattle, and Washington DC; in 1990 Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit,
Houston, Miami, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington DC. Changes
within these categories are minimal when we use the 1970 deﬁnitions. Under these deﬁnitions Philadelphia was in
the top quartilein 1940 and Detroit in 1980 and Tampa-St. Petersburg was in the second highest quartile.
22Classifyingcity size by the number of college graduates rather than of people should not yield different results.










































on metropolitan areas (or on the state in the case of non-metropolitan areas). Finally, we predict





w, for a white household in which
the husband is 35 years of age conditional on being a power, part-power, or low-power couple.23
Forsingleindividualsweestimatesimilarmultinomiallogitspeciﬁcations(separatelyformenand
women) except that we control only for own characteristics.24 We then predict locational choice
for single, white individuals age 35 conditional on being a power or a low-power individual. We
use our predicted probabilitiesfromour speciﬁcation for couplesto estimatethe doubleand triple
differences in Equations 4 and 5. We use our predicted probabilities from our speciﬁcation for
couples together with those from our speciﬁcation for singles to estimate the triple difference in
Equation 8.
4 Results: Locational Choice
Table5 shows thepredictedprobabilities,conditionalon being apower,part-power,or low-power
couple, of locational choice across city sizes and the wife’s labor force participation status for
23Estimates of bivariate probits on whether the wife works and whether the couple lives in a large city suggested
littlecorrelation across the error terms of these two equations.
24Because never married singles who were householdheads were generally in the labor force we obtained similar
estimates regardless of whetherourdependentvariable consistedof10 locationalchoice-laborforce statuscategories
or 5 locational choice categories. The results that we present are derived from a multinomial logit model with 10
locational choice-labor force status categories, but we present only aggregated results.
15a white couple in which the husband was 35 years old.25 Note that power couples are leaving
non-metropolitan areas and moving to the largest metropolitan areas. In 1940 30 percent were in
non-metropolitan areas whereas in 1990 13 percent were. In 1940 40 percent were in the largest
metropolitan areas whereas in 1990 50 percent were. The largest changes were between 1970
and 1980 when the share in non-metropolitan areas declined from 30 to 17 percent. The timing
of this decline coincides with the entry of women who aspired to “career then family” into the
labor force.
Powercouplesareincreasinglyconcentratinginlargemetropolitanareasrelativetopart-
power or low-power couples (see Figure 1). Between 1940 and 1990 the predicted proportion of
low power couples located in non-metropolitan areas fell only from 34 percent to 28 percent and
their share in the largest metropolitanareas barely changed from 33 to 32 percent. The predicted
percentage of part power couples in the largest metropolitan areas rose from 38 to 42 percent.
Table 5 also shows that for power couples the predicted labor force participation rate of
women rose more sharply in larger than in smaller metropolitan areas and in non-metropolitan
areas. Between 1940 and1990 thepredictedproportionofpowercouplesin which thewifeworks
located in large cities rose from 8 to 35 percent. The largest change was between 1970 and 1980
when the proportion rose from 12 to 28 percent. In contrast, the predicted percentage of power
couplesin which thewifeworkslocated in non-metropolitanareasrose onlyfrom 4 to 10 percent.
The predicted proportion of working power couples in major cities grew relative to
working part or low-power couples. Between 1940 and 1990 this ﬁgure increased only from 6 to
27 percent for part-powercouplesand from5 to 21 percent forlowpower couples. Between 1970
and 1980 when the predicted proportion of working couples in major cities more than doubled
25Althoughwe used 4 metropolitanarea groupingsin our estimation we present only aggregated predictions. The
concentrationofpower couples was greater bycitysize inallyears, except for1990, when itwas lowerinthe highest
city size category than in the next highest.
16Table 5: PredictedProbabilitiesofLocational ChoiceandWife’sLabor ForceParticipation(LFP)
Status Conditional on Household Type
1940 1970 1980 1990
Conditional on Low-Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.329 0.257 0.147 0.104
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.012 0.157 0.149 0.179
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.248 0.196 0.176 0.130
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.049 0.112 0.194 0.256
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.282 0.190 0.169 0.127
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.051 0.089 0.165 0.205
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Conditional on Part-Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.259 0.230 0.089 0.053
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.024 0.118 0.120 0.133
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.272 0.195 0.174 0.122
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.053 0.100 0.206 0.272
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.324 0.265 0.199 0.149
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.059 0.092 0.212 0.270
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Conditional on Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.250 0.183 0.052 0.027
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.035 0.113 0.120 0.101
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.260 0.174 0.134 0.095
(0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.053 0.107 0.235 0.281
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.313 0.316 0.178 0.144
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Large metropolitanarea, LFP=1 0.087 0.107 0.282 0.353
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Note. Allpredictionsare from a multinomiallogitmodel(see text fordetails). The predictionsare fora white
couple in which the husband was 35 years old. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Conditional on
couple type, the columns should sum to one. 17Figure1: Predicted Probability of Being in a Large City for Power Couples, Part-PowerCouples,
and Low-Power Couples
Note. Predicted probabilitiesare from Table 5. See table notes for estimation details.
18for power couples it only doubled for part-power couples and less than doubled for low-power
couples.
Table 5 shows that when the wife does not work the predicted locational choice of part-
powerand powercouples looksvery similar. In 1990 thepredictedproportionof coupleslivingin
the largest cities and in which the wife does not work was 15 percent for part-power couples and
14 percent for power couples whereas the respective ﬁgures for part-power and power couples
in which the wife works were 27 and 35 percent. Our results suggest that the concentration of
working power couples in large cities does not depend upon their having additional income to
pay large city rents, but rather that it depends upon the colocation problem. Because smaller
cities offer lower rents part-power and power couples in which the wife does not work may gain
a relative pecuniary advantage in smaller metropolitan areas.
Table 6 explicitly presents the predicted differential trend in power couple relative to


























) couples locating in a particular city size between 1990 and 1940. If part-power
or low-power couples are subject to the same changes in amenity values and wages as power
couplesbut no colocationproblem thenthedoubledifferenceforlargecitiesshowstheincreasein
concentration of power couples explained by a worsening of the colocation problem. Table 6 also
shows estimates of this double differenceby wife’s labor force participation status. These double



































], to account for the differential effect of changes in amenity values and of
returnsto educationon powerand part-powercouplesand on couplesinwhich thewifeworksand
those in which the wife does not work. Note that the double differenceestimate using part-power
couplesasacontrolgroupsuggeststhat thefractionofpowercoupleslivinginlargecitiesbecause
of the diverse labor markets that large cities offer has risen by 0.06 whereas the triple difference
19suggests that it has risen by 0.05. Thus up to 52 to 62 percent of the 0.097 predicted increase in
the proportion of power couples living in large cities can be attributed to the growing severity of
the colocation problem. Both the double and triple difference show no change in the propensity
of power couples to live in the smaller metropolitan areas and a decline of 0.18 to 0.23 in their
propensity to live in non-metropolitan areas.
Aswewillshowin theremainderofthissection, ourﬁndingthatthecolocationproblem
explains at least 52 to 62 percent of the predicted increased concentration of power couples in
large cities from 1940 to 1990 stands the test of using other controls as well. These include
comparing power and part-power couples on the basis of whether the wife is in a traditionally
femaleoccupation. They alsoincludeusingtwonevermarriedindividualsofthesameeducational
attainment as controls.26 We therefore now turn to multinomial logit models of locational choice
for never married men and women to obtain their predicted locational choice probabilities.
We estimate separate multinomial logit models of locational choice for never married
men and women who were household heads and present their predicted locational choice proba-
bilities conditional on their being power or low-power individuals (see Table 7). The proportion
of never married men with less than a college education living in large cities rose from 38 to
48 percent whereas the proportion with a college education rose only from 46 to 52 percent.
Amongwomenthese increaseswere larger,withthepercentagewithless thanacollegeeducation
rising from 38 to 50 percent and that with at least a college education rising from 40 to 49
percent. The proportion of never married men and women with at least a college education living
in smaller metropolitan areas rose, with greater increases for men, and the proportion living in
non-metropolitan areas fell sharply.
26We use never married individuals as controls rather than non-married individuals because the divorced with
children may have stronger locational ties and because the divorced may have invested in their location because of
an original colocation problem.
20Table 6: Double and Triple Difference Estimates of Propensity to Live in Given Size City,












































￿40 0.057 0.021 -0.101
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005)













































































￿40 represent the change from 1940 to 1990 of the probability of being in a
given sized metropolitan area for power, part-power, and low-power couples respectively. Standard errors
are in parentheses. The double differences use part-power and low-power couples as control groups for
power couples both for the whole sample and for the sample conditional on wife’s labor force participation.
The triple differences are the differences between the double differences conditional on wife’s labor force
participation.
21Table 7: Predicted Probabilities of Locational Choice, Never Married Men and Women, Condi-
tional on Household Education
1940 1970 1980 1990
Men, Conditional on Low-Power
Non-metropolitan area 0.331 0.237 0.138 0.123
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Small metropolitan area 0.288 0.378 0.388 0.394
(0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Large metropolitan area 0.378 0.384 0.384 0.484
(0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Men, Conditional on Power
Non-metropolitan area 0.237 0.194 0.115 0.088
(0.029) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Small metropolitan area 0.307 0.392 0.397 0.397
(0.034) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Large metropolitan area 0.456 0.415 0.488 0.515
(0.042) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
Women, Conditional on Low-Power
Non-metropolitan area 0.250 0.249 0.118 0.104
(0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Small metropolitan area 0.353 0.374 0.414 0.408
(0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Large metropolitan area 0.397 0.377 0.468 0.488
(0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Women, Conditional on Power
Non-metropolitan area 0.265 0.230 0.116 0.094
(0.022) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)
Small metropolitan area 0.354 0.385 0.414 0.405
(0.027) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
Large metropolitan area 0.382 0.400 0.485 0.500
(0.029) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008)
Note. Allpredictionsare derived froma multinomiallogitmodeland forwhiteindividualswhowere 35years
old. Within each year for each household type the predicted probabilitiesshould sum to one.
22We use our predicted locational choice probabilities for never married men and women
and for power and low-power couples to estimate whether the increase in the proportion of
power and low-power couples living in large metropolitan areas is greater than the increase in
the probability that two individuals (one male and one female) coincidentally live in a large


































































































p indicates the probabilitythat a power (




M) or woman (
F) lives in a large city. We take the minimum of the two probabilities
because the smaller probability determines the proportion of coincidental power or low-power
couples living in large cities. Thus if there are 100 single power men and women, then at most
100 couples could form. But, if 40 of the men arein largecities and 60 arein small cities whereas
60 of the women are in large cities and 40 are in small cities then the probability of observing
a coincidental couple in a large city is only 0.4 and that of observing a coincidental couple in a
small city is also only 0.4.27
27Note that this method assumes that the numbers of single power men and single power women are the same, as
are the numbers of singlelow-powermen and singlelow-powerwomen. Althoughthisis a reasonable assumption in
1990, in 1940 there were more single unmarried power women because of the low marriage propensities of college
educated women and there were more single low-power men because many single women did not live in their own
households. However, whenwe formed coincidentalcouplesbased uponthenumbers ofmen and women, ourresults
23If cities are increasingly becoming marriagemarkets, then the probabilitythat a coinci-
dental couple lives in a metropolitan area may be even greater than the probability that a power

























This triple difference will underestimate the extent to which large cities solve the colocation
problem because an increasing fraction of singles will have to moved to large cities to preempt
the colocation problem.
Table 8 shows that the increase in the predicted probability that two single individuals
areinalargemetropolitanareais0.118forpowerindividualsand0.106forlow-powerindividuals.
Incontrast, whereasthepredictedconcentrationofpowercouplesin citieshasincreased by0.097,
that of low power couples has remained unchanged. Our results suggest that large cities are a
magnet for all single people, regardless of education level and that therefore the triple not the
doubledifferenceestimates the impact of the growingcolocation problem on the concentration of
power couples. Our triple differenceyield an estimate of 0.086, suggesting that 89 percent of the
0.097 predicted increase in the concentration of power couples in large cities between 1940 and
1990 can be explained by the colocation problem. Recall that our previous estimates using part
power couples as a control group suggested that 52 to 62 percent of the increase in the proportion
of power couples living in large cities could be attributed to the rising severity of the colocation
problem. When we restrict ourselves to working couples, then the triple difference implies that
53 percent of the predicted increasing concentration of power couples in large cities is explained
by changes in the extent of the colocation problem.
implied that by takingminimumprobabilitieswe were underestimatingthe extent to which married couples move to
larger cities because of the colocation problem.
24Table 8: Double and Triple Difference Estimates of Propensity to Live in Given Size City,
1940-1990, Using Marital Status as Control
City Size
Large Small Non-metropolitan










￿40 -0.001 0.069 -0.097
(0.017) (0.015) (0.007)
Coincidental Couples,























￿40 -0.021 -0.027 -0.005
(0.042) (0.053) (0.042)













































￿40 represent the change from 1940 to 1990 of the probabilityof being in a given sized









￿40 represent these probabilities for two
power and low-power single individuals. This probability for two singles, for example, is the smaller of the
probabilitiesofbeinginagivensized cityforsinglepowermenand forsinglepowerwomen. Robuststandard
errors in parentheses.
25Although we have used 1940 as our starting point because our interest has been in
long-run trends, we could use 1970 as a starting point as well. An advantage of doing so is
that there will be less measurement error in our classiﬁcations of households by educational
levels.28 Another advantage is that stratiﬁcation on wife’s labor force participationstatus is more
reasonable because income and substitution effects were small (Goldin 1990: 119-158). When
we use 1970 as a starting point, we ﬁnd that when we compare working power with working part
power couples the double difference estimate is very large (0.178 or 72 percent of the predicted
increased concentration of power couples in large cities) whereas for couples in which the wife
does not work the double difference estimate is negative (-0.056). Our resulting triple difference
estimate (0.234) therefore more than explains the increased concentration of power couples in
large cities between 1970 and 1990. When we compare working power couples with two single
individuals our triple difference estimate is 0.137 suggesting that 57 percent of the predicted
increased concentration of working power couples in large cities between 1970 and 1990 arises
from the growing colocation problem.29
Thus far we have not explicitly considered the wife’s occupation. But, a wife who
has at least a college education and is in an occupation that was traditionally male, say law or
medicine, is more likely to need the diversiﬁed labor market of a large city than a wife who is
in such a traditionally female occupation as that of school teacher. Wage differences across city
28Collegegraduationratesareoverstatedinthe1940census inpartbecause individualswhowenttothepreparatory
department withina college were enumerated as having gone to college. We thank Claudia Goldin for pointingthis
out to us.
29Conditional on the wife not working power couples were more likely to move away from large cities than
part-power couples from 1970 to 1990. Thus the simple double difference estimate using part-power couples as a
control groupfor power couples is only 0.012 or 16 percent of the increased concentration in power couples in large
cities. Similarly,when all power couples, regardless of thewife’s labor force participationstatus,are compared with
two single individuals, the triple difference estimate is 0.028 or 38 percent of the increased concentration of power
couples in large cities. Given that women have become more similar to men in terms of labor supply parameters
(Goldin1990: 119-158), it is more reasonable to stratifyon labor force participationstatus in 1970 and 1990than in
1940 and 1990.
26size in the non-proﬁt sector may be smaller and may have grown more so over time. In the
case of school teachers this may have been spurred by the move away from direct local funding
to state and federal funding and the move towards collective bargaining agreements (Flyer and
Rosen 1997). We therefore classify women’s occupations as traditionally female if women were
over-represented in these occupations relative to men in 1970.30 We then estimate a multinomial
logit in which the categories of the dependent variableare all 15 combinations of 5 location sizes
and of whether the wife is out of the labor force, the wife is in a traditional job, and the wife
is in a non-traditional occupation. Aggregating all metropolitan areas in the top 50th percentile
of the population distribution and all metropolitan areas in the bottom of the 50th percentile,
the predicted probabilities for a white couple in which the husband is 35 years old are given in
Table 9.
Table 9 shows that increases in the predicted concentration of power couples in large
cities have been particularly sharp for those couples in which the wife is in a non-traditional
occupation. The predicted proportion of power couples in which the wife works in a non-
traditionaloccupation and who werein a largecity increased from2 percent in 1940 to 21 percent
in 1990 but only from 2 to 13 percent among those in the smaller cities. However, for power
couples in which the wife works in a traditional occupation the increase was from 6 to 15 percent
in the larger metropolitan areas and from 3 to 15 percent in the smaller metropolitan areas.
Among part-powercouples the predicted proportion in the largest cities rose from 2 to 15 percent
when wives were working in non-traditional occupations. The increase was from 4 to 12 percent
when wives were working in traditional occupations. The increase in the smaller metropolitan
areas was from 2 to 13 percent regardless of whether wives were working in traditional or
30These occupations include that of school teacher, librarian, nurse, social worker, and secretary. Althoughsome
laborers and operatives may have been in traditionallyfemale laborer and operative occupations we cannot observe
this and therefore do not classify any laborers or operatives as being in traditionallyfemale occupations.
27Table 9: Predicted Probabilities of Locational Choice, Wife’s Labor Force Participation Status
(LFP), and Wife’s Job Type Conditional on Household Education
1940 1970 1980 1990
Conditionalon Low Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.329 0.193 0.151 0.105
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.121 0.050 0.060 0.073
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.030 0.065 0.087 0.101
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.251 0.208 0.171 0.130
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.015 0.056 0.080 0.107
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.030 0.062 0.102 0.144
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=0 0.287 0.252 0.180 0.134
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.017 0.054 0.075 0.088
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.030 0.058 0.092 0.119
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Conditionalon Part-Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.259 0.157 0.091 0.054
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.024 0.054 0.070 0.073
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.147 0.031 0.048 0.056
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.269 0.227 0.169 0.123
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.025 0.068 0.106 0.128
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.020 0.040 0.089 0.140
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=0 0.330 0.306 0.209 0.154
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.035 0.073 0.100 0.117
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.022 0.046 0.107 0.155
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued
28Table 9: Predicted Probabilities of Locational Choice, Wife’s Labor Force Participation Status
(LFP), and Wife’s Job Type (Continued)
1940 1970 1980 1990
Conditionalon Power
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.250 0.148 0.052 0.027
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.035 0.060 0.092 0.069
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Non-metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.008 0.026 0.030 0.032
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=0 0.257 0.215 0.129 0.095
(0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.032 0.073 0.146 0.146
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Small metropolitanarea, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.016 0.038 0.080 0.131
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=0 0.315 0.298 0.184 0.147
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=1 0.063 0.088 0.160 0.148
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Large metropolitan area, LFP=1, TraditionalJob=0 0.023 0.053 0.128 0.206
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Note. All predictions are derived from a multinomial logit model and are for white couples in which the
husband was 35 years old. Conditionalon couple type, the columns should sum to one.
29non-traditional jobs. The double difference estimate for power relative to part-power wives in
traditional occupations was 0.01. In contrast, that of power relative to part-power wives in non-
traditional occupations was 0.06, suggesting that the growth of the colocation problem accounts
for at least half of the increased concentration of power couples in large cities.
Recall that we predicted that for husbands and wives in the same occupation the couple
may not need the diversiﬁed labor market offered by a large city because her best choice is
his best choice. We tested whether for professionals the increase in the percentage of power
couples is larger if the 3 digit census occupational category of the husband and wife differ by
estimating amultinomiallogitconditional on bothhusband and wifebeing professionalsin which
the dependent variable consisted of city size and occupational type cells. We found that in 1970,
1980, and 1990 the predicted proportion of husband and wives of the same occupation did not
differ greatly by city size. It was a constant 9 percent in 1970 and in 1990 was 5 percent in the
non-metropolitan areas and 9 percent in the metropolitan areas. But, the predicted proportion of
husbands and wives of different occupations in 1970 was 18 percent in non-metropolitan areas
and 31 percent in metropolitan areas. By 1990 these ﬁgures were 12 and 34 percent, suggesting




among power couples in which the wife was in a non-traditional occupation and among power
couples in which the husband and wife were in different professional occupations. We argued
that the rising colocation problemmay account for about half of the increased migrationof power
couples to large metropolitan areas. Our analysis enables us to determine whether power couples
are more likely to be in a larger relative to a smaller city and how this has changed over time,
but not how many more power couples a city such as Buffalo would attract if its labor markets
30became more diverse but its climate did not change. To answer such a question we would need
to estimate a structural model of city choice by household type. The data requirements of such
an approach would be substantial, requiring us to specify for every city and every couple type the
expected present value of searching in that labor market and the value of amenities. A common
methodologyfor such an imputation isto assume aone factormodel such that an individualin the
top twentieth percentile of the wage distribution in one city is in the same percentile in another.
Research on regional factor pricing disputes that one factor representations of earnings are valid
(Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd 1996; Heckman and Scheinkman 1987).
5 Locational Choice: Monetary Incentives
The incentives for power couples to move to large citieswill diminish over timeif their continued
in-migration to large cities shifts out local labor supply along a stable demand curve. Increasing
returnstoscalemodels(suchasAcemoglu(1996))provideamicrofoundationformodelsinwhich
the demand for highly skilled workers increases with their numbers.31 Whether the increased
migration of power couples to large cities has led to a decline in their relative wages is therefore
an empirical issue. The higher rents of large cities will be a disincentive to migration.
We document the differential trend in wages for the high skilled by city size and the
trend in rents by city size to provide some indication of how the returns to being in a large city
are changing. We cannot observe how the expected present value of earnings net of rents has
changed, but we can ascertain how education adjusted earnings by city size and rents by city
size have changed over time and how they have changed for different household types (power,
31Acemoglu’s (1996) search model shows that ex ante investment and bilateral search in the labor market will
make the rate of return on human capital increasing in the average human capital of the workforce. In Becker and
Murphy’s (1992) model the greater density of urban areas lowers the costs of co-ordinatingspecialists.
31part-power, low-power). Even if all households were single in equilibrium wages could differ by
city size within an educational group because an individual cannot simultaneously sell his skills
to separate labor markets.32 Marriage creates bundles of bundles.

































variable indicating that the individual has had at least 4 years of college,
X is a vector consisting
of age, age squared, dummies indicating full time and part-time status, regional dummies, and
a dummy indicating whether the household was in a non-metropolitan area, and
u is an error
term.33 We restrict our sample to white households. Because for individuals in the government
or non-proﬁt sector, the spatial distribution of wages may be more compressed we estimate wage
regressions for four different samples – all men earning a salary, all men who are neither in a
government nor teaching job, all wage and salary women, and all women who are neither in
a government, teaching, or such other traditionally female job as nurse or librarian. We also
estimate how the husband and wife’s combined wage and salary income has changed by decade





























32For a model of skill bundlingin which a law of one price for skillsdoes not hold see Heckman and Scheinkman
(1987) and Rosen (1983).
33Because we assumed that a mean sized city within a non-metropolitan area was equal in size to one half the
size of the smallest city, we added a dummy variable controlling for non-metropolitan area. Our coefﬁcients on
populationweresimilar inbothourwageand rental regressions regardless ofwhether weexcluded non-metropolitan
areas. For the women we also estimated selection corrected wage regressions in 1980 and 1990. Because these
yielded results similar to those obtained from ordinary least squares, we present the ordinary least squares results.
32where
I is their combined wage and salary income (the income of wives not in the labor force is
set equal to 0),
d is the population of the metropolitan area,
C is a vector containing a dummy
variable equal to one if the husband is college educated and another dummy variable if the wife
is college educated,
X is a vector consisting of the age and age squared of the husband and of the
wife and four dummies for their full-time and part-time status, as well as regional dummies, and
a dummy indicating whether the household was in a non-metropolitan area, and an error term,
u.
We establish how the costs, in terms of rents, of being in a large city have grown, by


















r is rent in 1997 dollars,
d is population of the metropolitan area,
X is a vector consisting
of number of rooms (except for 1940 when this information is unavailable), regional dummies,
and a dummy equal to one if the individual was in a non-metropolitan area, and u is an error
term.34 We restrict the sample to renters because of the well-known systematic underreporting of
house values by home owners (Goodman and Ittner 1992).
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we need to clarify the interpretation of
our wage and rental regressions. The coefﬁcient on metropolitan area population in the wage
regression may be positive if it is proxying for productivity but negative if it is proxying for city
amenities (Roback 1982; Rosen 1979). In the rental regression this coefﬁcient will be positive
both if it is proxying for greater productivity and amenities. The population coefﬁcient in both
the wage and rental regressions may change from decade to decade as the growing concentration
of power couples in large cities raises rents and lowers wages. Ideally our regressions would
34The omission of rooms in 1970, 1980, and 1990 did not affect the coefﬁcient on metropolitan population,
suggesting that the omission of this variable in 1940 will not bias the results.
33yield reliable estimates of the costs and beneﬁts to living in large cities for different types of
households, but we recognizethat theremay be sortingon unobservableskills (Glaeser and Mare,
forthcoming).35
Tables 10 and 11 present predicted hourlywage differentialsby city size fromour wage
regressions for35year oldsworkingfulltimeandfullyear andlivingwithinthemeansized large,
small, and non-metropolitan city in a given year. Our predicted wage differentials show that for
men in all occupations the returns to city size have increased more sharply for college-educated
than for non-college educated men. When men in government and teaching jobs are excluded
from the sample, the differential returns to education in city size of the college-educated are only
slightly higher. Among all womenthose without acollege education in 1970 through1990 obtain
a higher differential return to larger cities than those with a college education, largely because
ruralareascontainmanywomeninsuch traditionallyfemaleoccupationsasteachingwhoarepaid
as well as their larger city counterparts. When women in government jobs and in traditionally
femaleoccupations areexcluded from thesample Table 11 shows that thereturnsto city size have
increased more for the college educated than for the non-college educated. Our results suggest
that for a power couple in which the wife is in a non-traditional occupation, the returns to being
in a large city have more than doubled, whereas for a low power couple the increase has been
somewhat smaller. Differentials in combined annual income also suggest that the returns to
power couples of being in large relative to small cities or to non-metropolitan areas have grown
more than the returns to part-power and low-power couples (see Table 12).
Table13presentsmonthlyrentdifferentialsbycitysizepredictedfromourrentalregres-
35One possible interpretation of our wage regressions is that they yield a measure of the cost of being the tied
mover or stayer. Ofek and Merrill (1997) showed that withina singleyear wives’ returns to education in large cities
wererelativelyhigherthanthoseoftheirhusbands’,suggestingthatthesizeofthetieislargerinsmaller cities. Frank
(1978b) showed that this was true for couples who had recently migrated. When we run a speciﬁcation similar to
that of Ofek and Merrill (1997), our results suggest that women in non-traditionaloccupations obtain higher returns
than men to being in a large city, but that this return has ﬂuctuated since 1940.
34Table 10: Predicted Hourly Wage Differentials (in 1997 $) for Married Men by City Size and
Educational Status, 1940-1990
Not College Educated College Educated
City Size Differentials City Size Differentials
Large- Small- Large- Large- Small- Large-
Small Nonmetro- Nonmetro- Small Nonmetro- Nonmetro-
politan politan politan politan
All
1940 0.56 1.22 1.78 0.27 1.22 1.49
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
1970 1.40 1.73 3.13 1.99 2.39 4.38
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.24) (0.28)
1980 1.11 1.17 2.28 2.09 2.03 4.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
1990 2.14 1.41 3.55 3.65 2.55 6.20
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09)
D90
￿40 1.58 0.19 1.77 3.38 1.33 4.71
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Restricted
1940 0.27 1.22 1.49 0.34 1.28 1.62
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
1970 1.99 2.39 4.38 1.90 2.32 4.27
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.33) (0.11) (0.37)
1980 2.09 2.03 4.12 2.13 2.15 4.28
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
1990 3.65 2.55 6.20 3.91 2.66 6.57
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
D90
￿40 3.38 1.33 4.71 3.57 1.38 4.95
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.13) (0.17) (0.19)
Note. All values were predicted from a regression of the logarithm of wages on the logarithm of population
size, a dummy equal to one if the individual was college-educated, the interaction between this dummy and
populationsize, age, age squared, dummies indicatingfulltime and part-year status, regional dummies, and a
dummyindicatingwhetherthehouseholdwasinanon-metropolitanarea. Predictedvaluesare forindividuals
aged 35 working full-timeand full-year and living within the mean sized large, small, and non-metropolitan
area in each year. Regional dummies were set equal to their mean values within each year. The restricted
sample excludes men in government and teaching jobs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
35Table 11: Predicted Hourly Wage Differentials (in 1997 $) for Married Women by City Size and
by Educational Status, 1940-1990
Not College Educated College Educated
City Size Differentials City Size Differentials
Large- Small- Large- Large- Small- Large-
Small Nonmetro- Nonmetro- Small Nonmetro- Nonmetro-
politan politan politan politan
All
1940 0.92 0.98 1.9 1.64 1.63 3.27
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20)
1970 1.03 0.89 1.92 0.96 0.89 1.85
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.18)
1980 0.94 0.67 1.61 0.92 0.59 1.51
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
1990 1.68 1.27 2.95 2.11 1.55 3.66
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
D90
￿40 0.76 0.29 1.05 0.47 -0.08 0.39
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22)
Restricted
1940 0.47 0.82 1.29 0.63 1.09 1.72
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.42) (0.84) (0.81)
1970 1.05 0.89 1.94 1.15 1.02 2.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 1.95 1.35 3.30
1980 1.10 0.72 1.82 1.95 1.35 3.30
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
1990 1.94 1.39 3.33 3.28 2.37 5.65
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
D90
￿40 1.47 0.57 2.04 2.65 1.31 3.93
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.43) (0.84) (0.81)
Note. All values were predicted from a regression of the logarithm of wages on the logarithm of population
size, a dummy equal to one if the individual was college-educated, the interaction between this dummy and
populationsize, age, age squared, dummies indicatingfulltime and part-timestatus, regionaldummies, and a
dummyindicatingwhetherthehouseholdwasinanon-metropolitanarea. Predictedvaluesare forindividuals
aged 35 working full-timeand full-year and living within the mean sized large, small, and non-metropolitan
area in each year. Regional dummies were set equal to their mean values within each year. The restricted
sampleexcludes womeningovernment and teachingjobsand traditionalfemale occupations. Robuststandard
errors in parentheses.
36Table 12: Predicted Differences in Combined Annual Income (in 1997 $) Across City Size





1940 2,618 4,106 6,724
(881) (761) (884)
1970 3,809 4,497 8,307
(783) (702) (863)
1980 4,432 3,880 8,312
(772) (657) (877)
1990 9,037 6,083 15,120
(612) (520) (645)
D90
￿40 6,419 1,977 8,396
(1,073) (922) (1,094)
Conditional on Part-power
1940 598 575 1,174
(1,474) (1,454) (1,652)
1970 4,952 4,163 9,116
(1,389) (1,300) (1,492)
1980 7,419 6,755 14,174
(1,639) (973) (1,546)
1990 14,187 12,635 21,664
(1,909) (997) (1,799)
D90
￿40 13,589 12,060 20,490
(2,412) (4,281) (2,442)
Conditional on Power
1940 852 7,028 7,880
(1,877) (2,019) (1,877)
1970 5,783 5,723 11,506
(2,162) (1,186) (2,026)
1980 8,324 6,016 14,339
(1,506) (1,280) (2,741)
1990 16,383 10,871 27,254
(1,767) (1,260) (1,704)
D90
￿40 15,531 3,843 19,374
(2,578) (2,380) (2,535)
Note. All values were predicted from a regression of the logarithm of wages on the logarithm of population
size, a dummy equal to one if the individual was college-educated, the interaction between this dummy and
populationsize, age, age squared, dummies indicatingfulltime and part-timestatus, regionaldummies, and a
dummyindicatingwhetherthehouseholdwasinanon-metropolitanarea. Predictedvaluesare forindividuals
aged 35 working full-timeand full-year and living within the mean sized large, small, and non-metropolitan
area in each year. Regional dummies were set equal to their mean values within each year. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
37Table 13: Predicted Monthly Differences in Rental Values (in 1997 $) Across City Size




1940 63.43 96.38 159.81
(12.51) (5.91) (11.90)
1970 76.86 92.64 169.50
(18.08) (11.03) (15.79)
1980 85.80 134.60 220.40
(15.91) (6.01) (14.88)
1990 151.21 165.95 317.16
(18.22) (6.71) (17.08)
Note. Predictions are from yearly rental regressions holding constant within each year the number of rooms
and the region dummies at the mean values of that year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
sions for mean-sized cities within large and small metropolitan areas and for non-metropolitan
areas, holdingconstant withineach yearthenumberofroomsandtheregiondummiesatthemean
values of that year. Rents in large cities were 1.7 times higher in 1990 than in 1940 but in small
metropolitan areas were only 1.5 times higher and in non-metropolitan areas 1.3 times higher.
Because power, part-power, and low-power couples face the same rents but the wage incentives
to power couples of being in a large city increased by more, our results suggest that cities have
become relatively more attractive to power couples than to part-power or low-power couples.
The smaller rental increases in small cities and non-metropolitanareas have given part-powerand
low-power couples a relative advantage.
The predictions from combined annual wage and salary regressions can be used to
illustrate the impact of the move away from non-metropolitan areas on household income in-
equality. The difference between power and low-power couples in combined annual wage and
salary income (in 1997 $) in 1940 was $17,092 in large cities, $18,858 in small cities, and
$15,936 in non-metropolitan areas. In 1990 these respective differences were $35,376, $28,030,
38and $23,242. The move away from non-metropolitan areas and the concomitant increase in the
labor force participation rate of power wives in large cities has increased inequality both across
city size within a given decade and within large cities across decades.
6 Universities and City Size
Our ﬁnding that since 1940 power couples have been increasingly likely to locate in large
metropolitan areas and that the growth of the colocation problem accounts for much of this trend
has implications for city growth. Because of the bundling problem ﬁrms in smaller cities may
ﬁnd that it is becoming harder and harder to attract highly skilled individuals. We illustrate the
difﬁculties faced by ﬁrms in small cities with suggestive evidence on a particular type of ﬁrm –
the university. One advantage of examining universities is that their capital to labor ratio is fairly
ﬁxed. Another is that universities, unlike ﬁrms, rarely move. We therefore examine whether the
relative quality of graduate research doctorate programs in small cities in the United States has
fallen since 1970 to learn whether a ﬁrm that employs highly skilled workersis now less likely to
locate to a small city.
We use the National Research Council’s dataset, Research Doctorate Programs in the
United States, to obtain rankings of 1,142 graduate programs of 100 universities in 1993, 1983,
and 1970 and we link these data to metropolitan area population. (We use the same metropolitan
areas as in our previous empirical work.) We classify all programs into quintiles: distinguised,
strong, good, adequate, and marginal. We then estimate an ordered probit model in which
the dependent variable consists of a categorical variable for our ﬁve groups and in which the
independent variables are the logarithm of metropolitan area population, dummy variables for
broad program ﬁeld (arts and humanities, biological sciences, engineering, physical sciences and
mathematics, and social and behavioral sciences), and a dummy variable equal to one if the
39Table 14: Derivatives of Probability that Graduate School Program is Distinguished, Strong,
Good, Adequate, and Marginal With Respect to Logarithm of City Population, 1993, 1983, and
1970
Derivative wrt
Logarithm of City Population
1970 1983 1993
Mean of Logarithm of Population 7.075 7.547 7.673
Probability
Distinguished (Top Quintile) 0.007 0.024 0.027
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Strong 0.007 0.013 0.007
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Good -0.000 -0.006 -0.011
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Adequate -0.005 -0.016 -0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Marginal (Bottom Quintile) -0.010 -0.027 -0.027
(0.013) (0.019) (0.020)
Note. 1142 observations in all years. Population is in the 1000s. Derivatives are estimated
from an ordered probit model (see text for estimation details). Standard errors are in
parentheses. We rejected the hypothesis that 1970 and 1993 and 1970 and 1983 should be
pooled.
university was a public institution.
Table 14 presents the derivatives with respect to the logarithm of metropolitan area
population from the ordered probit model. Note that the relationship between graduate program
ranking and population size is stronger in 1993 than in 1970. In 1970 an increase of one in the
logarithm of population increased the probability that a program would be ranked distinguished
by 0.007 and decreased the probability that it would be ranked marginal by 0.010. The respective
ﬁgures for 1993 were 0.027 and 0.027. The relative decline in quality of universities in small
cities suggests that if there are spillover effects from universities larger rather than smaller cities
are more likely to reap these beneﬁts.
407 Implications
This paper has documented the rising concentration of power couples in larger over smaller
metropolitan areas and over non-metropolitan areas relative to other household types and to
that which would have been predicted for two observationally identical single individuals. We
estimated that about half of the increased concentration of power couples in larger metropolitan
areas could be explained by the colocation problem. We also showed that the wage incentives of
being in a large city have increased since 1940 and that this increase has been particularly large
for college educated men and for college-educated women in non-traditional occupations. We
showed that the disincentives of being in a large city, in terms of rents, have increased as well.
Because rentincreaseshavebeen smallerin smallcitiesand innon-metropolitanareashouseholds
other than power couples have a relative advantage in these locations.
An outcome of the increased concentration of power couples in large cities has been to
increase household income inequality. Because large cities solve the colocation problem, wives
are more likely to work in large cities because their labor commands a higher wage. In fact, in
1990 household income inequality was greater in metropolitan than in non-metropolitan areas.
The increased concentration of power couples in large metropolitan areas may have
implications for the dynamics of city growth. Economic growth depends upon the ability to
absorb existing knowledge and to create new knowledge, both of which are directly related to
the existing stock of human capital. Smaller markets have always exported the highly skilled to
larger markets and, as this paper has documented, this phenomenon has been magniﬁed by the
increased bundling of the highly skilled with other highly skilled spouses. Cities, especially low
amenity cities, may facea greater net “brain drain” than in the absence of power couplebundling.
The colocation problem may also affect a small city’s adjustment to local labor market shocks.
Regional adjustmenttolocal labormarketshocksisprimarilydrivenbylabormobility(Blanchard
41and Katz (1992)). But, because of bundling a small city may only slowly attract high skilled
talent despite a local boom. Forseeing this, ﬁrms may be unwilling to locate in smaller cities.
Universities provide suggestive evidence. We have shown that although the quality of graduate
doctoral programs was positively related to city size in both 1970 and in 1993, the relationship
between program ranking and city size has become stronger.
This paper has sketched a 50 year trend in power couple locational choice, but will
information technology affect future locational choice? It is possible that the growth of infor-
mation technology that permits highly skilled workers to telecommute may solve the colocation
problem for some couples by permitting at least one spouse to live far from where their employer
is located. This could allow smaller cities to attract a highly skilled couple. But, as more power
couples become true dual career households, an increasing proportion of power couples will be
faced with a colocation problem and the 50 year trend suggests that they will turn to large cities.
Furthermore, information technologies may be a complement, not a substitute, for living in a
large city if they facilitate making new business contacts (Gaspar and Glaeser 1998). Power
couples are likely to have a comparative advantage in making new contacts relative to two highly
educated single people. Although this paper has not explicitly explored the couple "synergies"
of two highly educated people being married, a power couple may work as a "team" to maximize
household income. They will therefore both seek potential business contacts who can work with
them or their spouse and such contacts are more likely to be found in large cities.
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